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Abstract
We consider goods that can be shared with k-hop
neighbors (i.e., the set of nodes within k hops from
an owner) on a social network. We examine incen-
tives to buy such a good by devising game-theoretic
models where each node decides whether to buy the
good or free ride. First, we find that social ineffi-
ciency, specifically excessive purchase of the good,
occurs in Nash equilibria. Second, the social inef-
ficiency decreases as k increases and thus a good
can be shared with more nodes. Third, and most
importantly, the social inefficiency can also be sig-
nificantly reduced by charging free riders an access
cost and paying it to owners, leading to the conclu-
sion that organizations and system designers should
impose such a cost. These findings are supported
by our theoretical analysis in terms of the price of
anarchy and the price of stability; and by simula-
tions based on synthetic and real social networks.
1 Introduction
Social networks are known to play an important role in the
everyday choices people make. In particular, a significant
body of work studies the network effect, in which there are
payoffs from aligning one’s decision with those of others
[Markus, 1987; Blume, 1993; Ellison, 1993; Rogers, 2010].
For example, direct payoffs arise when friends or collabo-
rators use compatible technologies instead of incompatible
ones, that is, the game rewards coordination.
Our work considers the purchase of shareable goods,
which, in a sense, gives rise to a certain type of anti-
coordination game. Indeed, buying such a good yields a
benefit only when no friend buys the good, since otherwise
free riding is possible. An example that would be familiar
to most parents is seldom-used baby gear, such as portable
cribs, which are frequently borrowed by friends or friends of
friends; similar examples include ski gear and hiking equip-
ment. Expensive lab equipment provides a more pertinent ex-
ample: Confocal laser scanning microscopes, or polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) machines, are typically bought by one
investigator and used by collaborators. In the realm of AI,
one can imagine a multi-agent system populated by heteroge-
neous software agents that interact and share special compu-
tational resources, e.g., a high-end graphics processing unit
(GPU) for particularly demanding image processing tasks.
To examine incentives to buy shareable goods, we devise
game-theoreticmodels where each node on a network decides
whether to buy a good that is shareable with k-hop neigh-
bors (i.e., nodes within k hops from an owner), or free ride.
Specifically, the good in question is non-excludable and non-
rivalrous in that no k-hop neighbor can be excluded from use,
and use by a neighbor does not reduce availability to others.
Note that the goods in the examples given above are (essen-
tially) non-rivalrous, as any single person (or agent) requires
the good only from time to time.
We find that social inefficiency, specifically excessive pur-
chase of the good, occurs in Nash equilibria. Moreover, the
social inefficiency decreases as k increases and thus a good
is shared with more people. Finally, charging free riders an
access cost and paying it to owners also significantly reduces
the social inefficiency. We support these findings both theo-
retically and experimentally.
Compared with previous work on shareable goods on a net-
work, discussed in Section 5, our contributions are as follows:
• Efficiency Analysis of Equilibria : We provide worst-
case analysis of the efficiency of equilibria, in terms of
the price of anarchy and the price of stability.
• Simulation on Real-world Networks: The simplicity of
our model allows us to measure social inefficiency on
real-world social networks, with thousands of nodes,
through simulations of best-response dynamics.
• Mechanism Design: We analyze the effects of access
costs on social inefficiency and suggest an appropriate
cost for minimizing social inefficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we define shareable goods games on a network. In Section 3,
we give a theoretical analysis of the efficiency of equilibria.
In Section 4, we present simulation results. After discussing
related work in Section 5, we draw conclusions in Section 6.
2 Our Models
In this section, we formally define two game-theoreticmodels
of the purchase of shareable goods on a network.
2.1 Shareable Goods Game (SGG)
Consider an undirected network G = (V , E) where V =
{1, 2, ..., n}. The players of the game are nodes in G. Each
Table 1: Utility in an SGG.
state conditions utility (i.e., ui)
buy si = 1 b− p (> 0)
free ride si = 0,
∑
j∈Ni(k)
sj ≥ 1 b (> 0)
no access si = 0,
∑
j∈Ni(k)
sj = 0 0
Table 2: Utility in an SGG-AC.
state conditions utility (i.e., ui)
buy si = i b− p+ a|Fi|(> 0)
rent si = j(6= i), sj = j b− a(> 0)
no access si = j(6= i), sj 6= j 0
node decides whether to buy a good or not. The strategy of
node i is denoted by si ∈ Si, where Si = {0, 1} denotes the
strategy set of node i. If node i buys the good then si = 1,
and otherwise si = 0 (only pure strategies are considered).
Given any strategy profile s = (s1, s2, ..., sn), we use s−i to
denote the strategies taken by all nodes but i. Then, s is also
denoted by (si, s−i). The price of a good is p (> 0), which is
identical for all nodes. A node gets benefit b (> p) by having
access to a good and 0 otherwise. Each node i can access a
good if it buys the good itself or has at least one node who
buys the good within k (≥ 1) hops. We assume that hav-
ing access to multiple goods does not increase the benefit of
a node and that being accessed by multiple nodes does not
decrease the benefit derived from a good (non-rivalry).
In this setting, the utility ui(s) of node i under strategy pro-
file s depends on the strategies of its k-hop neighbors Ni(k)
(i.e., the set of nodes within k-hops from i including i itself),
as given in Table 1. Note that each node gets the highest util-
ity b when it free rides and the second highest utility b − p
when it buys the good. Each node gets the lowest utility 0
when neither the node nor its k-hop neighbors buy the good.
SGG extends the best-shot game [Hirshleifer, 1983], which
is equivalent to SGG if k = 1, by considering not only direct
but k-hop neighbors. SGG-AC, discussed in the following
subsection, further extends SGG by considering access costs.
2.2 Shareable Goods Game with Access Costs
(SGG-AC)
In this subsection, we extend the game defined in the previ-
ous section to a game we call the shareable goods game with
access costs (SGG-AC), where each free rider has to pay an
access cost. We focus on the differences from an SGG.
The strategy set of each node i is Si = Ni(k), its k-hop
neighbors including i itself. If node i buys a good then si = i,
and if node i does not buy a good but wants to access a good
bought by node j 6= i then si = j. If si = j for j 6= i, and
node j actually buys a good (i.e., sj = j) then node i derives
benefit from the good at the expense of paying an access cost
of a (< p) to node j. The followers of node i, the set of nodes
who want to access the good bought by node i, are denoted
by Fi = {j ∈ Ni(k)\{i} : sj = i}. Then, the utility ui(s)
of node i under strategy profile s in an SGG-AC is given in
Table 2. Define the follower threshold ξ = ⌈p/a⌉−1; for ease
of exposition we assume that p/a is not an integer. If node i
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(c) NE (cost = p)
Figure 1: Example strategy profiles in an SGG when k = 1.
(a) is not an NE since each of node 3 and node 6 would be
better off not buying. Between the NEs, (c) leads to a lower
social cost than (b).
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Figure 2: Example strategy profiles in an SGG-AC when k =
1 and ξ = 2. Arrows indicate who accesses whose products.
(a) is not an NE since node 6 is better off not buying. Between
the NEs, (c) leads to a lower social cost than (b).
has at least ξ followers (i.e., |Fi| ≥ ξ), it has the highest
utility when it buys a good (i.e., si = i). Otherwise, renting a
good is preferred. Each node has the lowest utility when it is
not accessing any good.
3 Analysis of Equilibria
In this section, we define equilibria in the games described in
Section 2. Then, we analyze the efficiency of the equilibria in
terms of price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability (PoS).
3.1 Definition and Existence of Equilibria
We use the ubiquitous concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) as
our solution concept. We first formally define it.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium). A strategy profile s =
(si, s−i) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no node can increase
its utility by changing its strategy given the strategies of the
other nodes, i.e.,
∀i ∈ V , ∀s′i ∈ Si, ui((si, s−i)) ≥ ui((s
′
i, s−i)).
Figures 1 and 2 give examples of NEs in an SGG
and an SGG-AC, respectively, with explanations. Note
that a strategy profile is an NE in an SGG if and only
if the set of owners is a k-independent dominating set
[Kreuter and Nierhoff, 1997], i.e., any two owners have dis-
tance at least k + 1 and every node has distance at most k to
some owner. Theorem 1 states that an NE always exists in
both games.
Theorem 1 (Existence of Nash Equilibria). An NE exists in
any SGG and SGG-AC.
Proof. Given G = (V , E), k and ξ, the following procedure
gives an NE s for any SGG and s′ for any SGG-AC. Choose
an arbitrary node i in the graph, let i buy a good (si = 1,
s′i = i), and for each node j within k hops from i, let j follow
Table 3: Summary of our analysis of efficiency of equilibria.
in SGG in SGG-AC
k = 1
PoA
Θ(n)
Θ(n)
PoS Θ(ξ) (= 1 if ξ ≤ 2)
k > 1
PoA
Θ(n/k)
Θ(max(n/k, n/ξ))
PoS Θ(ξ/k) (= 1 if ξ ≤ 2⌊k/2⌋ + 1)
i (sj = 0, s
′
j = i). Delete i and all nodes within k hops from
i, and repeat until there is no node left in G. At the end, every
node either buys a good or accesses its k-hop neighbor’s.
Each node that accesses its k-hop neighbor’s good cannot
increase its utility by buying a good since the utility of access-
ing its k-hop neighbor’s is greater than that of buying (and no
one follows). Each node i that buys a good also cannot in-
crease its utility by following another node because the pro-
cedure ensures that there is no node that buys a good and is
within distance k from i. Therefore, s and s′ are NEs for the
given SGG and SGG-AC, respectively.
3.2 Social Inefficiency in Equilibria
We now turn to the analysis of NEs in our games. It is im-
portant to note that a node that does not access any good can
increase its utility by buying a good, without decreasing the
utilities of the others in both of our games (see Tables 1 and
2). Thus, if we let T be the set of strategy profiles where
every node accesses a good and thus gets benefit b 1, then all
NEs belong to T . Due to the same reason, every socially opti-
mal strategy profile (i.e., strategy profile s maximizing social
welfare
∑
i∈V ui(s)) belongs to T . Therefore, to define PoA
and PoS, we only need to consider the strategy profiles in T .
Since all strategy profiles in T have the same sum of benefits,
we can compare them simply by their social cost, which is
proportional to the number of nodes buying a good (see Def-
inition 2). Importantly, access costs in SGG-AC cancel out
(they are paid by some players to others) and do not affect the
social cost.
Definition 2 (Social Cost). Given a graph G = (V , E), the
social cost of a strategy profile s = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ T is the
sum of prices paid by the nodes, i.e.,
cost(s) =
{
p · |{i ∈ V : si = 1}| in SGG
p · |{i ∈ V : si = i}| in SGG-AC.
The price of anarchy (PoA) is defined as the social cost of
the worst NE divided by minimum social cost (see Defini-
tion 3) and the price of stability (PoS) is defined as the social
cost of the best NE divided by minimum social cost (see Def-
inition 4). Large PoA and PoS indicate that NEs are socially
inefficient.
Definition 3 (Price of Anarchy). Given a graph G = (V , E)
with n nodes, the price of anarchy (PoA) is defined as
PoA =
maxs∈T : s is an NE cost(s)
mins∈T cost(s)
.
1In SGG, s ∈ T ⇔ ∀i ∈ V,
∑
j∈Ni(k)
sj ≥ 1.
In SGG-AC, s ∈ T ⇔ ∀i ∈ V , (si = i or (si = j and sj = j)).
Not BuyBuy Access
...
...{ }n2 -1 n2 -1
(a) Best NE in SGG
...
...{ }n2 -1 n2 -1
(b) Best NE in SGG-AC
Figure 3: An example of social inefficiency in an SGG. As-
sume k = 1. Arrows indicate who accesses whose products.
In this example graph, the best NE in an SGG is (a), whose
social cost is np/2. In an SGG-AC (with ξ ≤ n/2− 1), how-
ever, the best NE is (b), whose social cost is 2p, equal to the
minimum social cost.
Definition 4 (Price of Stability). Given a graph G = (V , E)
with n nodes, the price of stability (PoS) is defined as
PoS =
mins∈T : s is an NE cost(s)
mins∈T cost(s)
.
In Table 3, we summarize the results of our worst-case ef-
ficiency analysis. That is, we analyze the two measures in the
worst case over all graphs. As stated in Theorem 2, both the
PoA and PoS in SGGs are Θ(n/k) in the worst case. That
is, not only worst NEs but also best NEs can be severely in-
efficient, with social cost as high as n/k times the optimum.
Figure 3(a) shows an example of such inefficiency for k = 1,
where even the best NEs in the SGG have social cost np/2,
while the minimum social cost, in Figure 3(b), is 2p.
Theorem 2 (PoA and PoS in SGG). PoA and PoS in SGG
are both Θ(n/k) in the worst case.
Proof. For the upper bound on PoA, fix an arbitrary NE s ∈
T . Let k′ = ⌊k/2⌋, and for each node i ∈ V that buys a
good, consider Ni(k
′), the set of nodes within distance k′
from i (called a ball around i). Since each pair of nodes that
buy a good are at distance at least k+1 from each other, these
balls are pairwise disjoint.
Call a ball N (k′) big if it has at least k′ nodes, and small
otherwise. If a ball Ni(k′) is small, i is in a connected com-
ponent with less than k′ nodes, and there is no other node that
buys a good in that component. Let c be the number of con-
nected components in G; there are at most n/k′ big balls and
c small balls. The number of nodes that buy a good is equal
to the number of balls, which is at most n/k′ + c.
Since the optimal social cost is at least cp, the ratio be-
tween the social cost of s and the optimum is at most (n/k′+
c)p/(cp) ≤ n/k′ + 1 = O(n/k).
For the lower bound on PoS, given integers k,m ≥ 1, con-
sider a tree G = (V , E) where there are two center nodes 1
and 2, and 2m simple paths with k nodes. For m of them
(called left arms), one of two endpoints is connected to 1. For
the otherm of them (called right arms), one of two endpoints
is connected to 2. Finally, 1 and 2 are connected. Figure 3
shows such a graph with k = 1 and m = n/2 − 1. It is easy
to see that the optimal social cost is at most 2p, since if 1 and
2 buy a good, all nodes can access at least one good.
We claim that any NE has social cost at least mp. Fix an
NE s. In s, either 1 or 2 does not buy a good, since they
can access each other’s goods. Without loss of generality,
suppose that 1 does not buy a good. Consider a left arm,
specifically the endpoint of the arm not connected to 1. The
only nodes within distance k from this endpoint are 1 and
the nodes in the same arm. Since 1 does not buy a good,
there must be a node in the same arm who buys a good. This
argument holds for each left arm, so at least m nodes buy a
good, establishing the claim.
Since the optimal social cost is at most 2p and any NE has
social cost at least mp, PoS ≥ mp/(2p) = Ω(n/k). Since
PoS ≤ PoA, the theorem holds.
Intuitively speaking, the main reason for the inefficiency
of NEs in SGGs is that high-degree nodes (i.e., nodes with
many k-hop neighbors) are less likely to buy goods even
whenmany neighbors can benefit from goods bought by high-
degree nodes. Indeed, high-degree nodes are more likely to
have a neighbor buying a good, and thus choose to free ride.
To incentivize high-degree nodes to buy goods, we can
force their neighbors who access the good to pay an access
fee to the node — as we do in SGG-ACs. In Figure 3(b),
for example, the two high-degree nodes in the center still buy
goods, even when they can free ride, since they receive access
fees from ξ or more followers, minimizing social cost.
This improvement through access costs is formalized and
generalized in Theorem 3, where we show that the worst-case
PoS in SGG-ACs is Θ(ξ/k), which is significantly smaller
than Θ(n/k) in SGGs. In particular, if ξ ≤ max(2⌊k/2⌋ +
1, 2), then the PoS in SGG-ACs is 1, i.e., the social cost in
the best equilibria is always optimal even in the worst case.
Among ξ values satisfying the condition, the largest one (i.e.,
ξ = max(2⌊k/2⌋+ 1, 2)) is preferred to minimize the PoA,
which is inversely proportional to ξ, as shown by Theorem 4.
Theorem 3 (PoS in SGG-AC). PoS in SGG-ACs isΘ(ξ/k) in
the worst case. In particular, it is 1 (i.e., there are guaranteed
to be socially optimal equilibria) if ξ ≤ max(2⌊k/2⌋+ 1, 2).
Proof. For the upper bound, given G = (V , E), k, and ξ, let
A∗ ⊆ V be a smallest set of the nodes such that for each node
i ∈ V , there is a node j ∈ A∗ such that i and j are within
distance k from each other (i.e., |A∗| · p is the optimal social
cost). Consider a strategy profile s where each node in A∗
buys a good, and all other nodes access a good of a node in
A∗ such that for each i ∈ A∗, the set of nodes that access i’s
good induces a connected subgraph. Call a node an owner if
it buys a good. An owner i is called a rich owner if |Fi| ≥ ξ,
and a poor owner otherwise. That is, an owner i is a rich
owner if and only if ui(s) is at least the utility of renting a
good. Note that s ∈ T is not an NE if and only if there is a
poor owner who can access a good of another owner.
From s, we show how to construct an NE whose social cost
is at mostΘ(ξ/k) · |A∗| ·p. If there is a poor owner i who can
follow another owner j, let i follow j. For each node who
previously followed i, if it can follow another owner, let it
follow that owner. Call a node underprivileged if it previously
followed i but cannot follow any other owner. Scan the list of
underprivileged nodes sequentially. When ℓ is considered, let
ℓ be an owner (call it a new owner) and be followed by all still
underprivileged nodes who can follow ℓ (and remove them
from the underprivileged nodes list). At the end of this loop
no node is left underprivileged. Repeat until no poor owner i
can follow another owner j.
One of the invariants of this procedure is that any new
owner ℓ can never access a good of any other owner — ℓ
became a new owner since it could not access a good of any
other owner, and, subsequently, any node i ∈ Nℓ(k) can-
not become a new owner, as it can follow ℓ, i.e., ℓ ∈ Ni(k).
Therefore, this procedure always terminates, after having at
most |A∗| owners follow other owners. The final strategy
after termination is an NE since there is no underprivileged
node and no poor owner who can follow another owner.
To bound the number of new owners, note that when an
owner i ∈ A∗ deviated to follow another owner j, among
i’s previous followers including i (call them Ci), at most
max(1, ⌊ ξ⌊k/2⌋+1 ⌋) new owners can be created. This is be-
cause |Ci| ≤ ξ (since i was a poor owner) and if we let k′ =
⌊k/2⌋, and consider the ballNℓ(k′) around each new owner ℓ,
|Nℓ(k′)∩Ci| ≥ min(k′+1, |Ci|) and all balls are pairwise dis-
joint (all new owners are at distance at least k + 1 from each
other). The deviation of i creates at most max(1, ⌊ ξk′+1⌋)
new owners. Therefore, the number of owners in the final NE
is at most |A∗|·max(1, ⌊ ξk′+1⌋) = O(
ξ
k ·|A
∗|). If ξ ≤ 2k′+1,
max(1, ⌊ ξk′+1⌋) = 1 so the resulting NE is a social optimum.
The same conclusion holds when ξ ≤ 2 since one deviation
creates at most one new owner.
For the lower bound of Ω(ξ/k), for any integers k, ξ such
thatm = ξ−1k is an integer, build the same tree as in the proof
of Theorem 2. As before, the optimal social cost is 2p, and the
social cost at NEs is at least mp. To see why the latter claim
holds, note that (as before) 1 and 2 cannot simultaneously be
owners because the total number of nodes other than 1 and
2 is 2(ξ − 1), so that at least one of 1 and 2 must be a poor
owner. Using the same argument as before, the number of
owners is at leastm = ξ−1k , and PoS ≥
ξ−1
2k = Ω(
ξ
k ).
Theorem 4 (PoA in SGG-AC). PoA in SGG-ACs is Θ(max
(n/k, n/ξ)) in the worst case.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that PoA in SGG-AC has the same order as PoA in
SGG if ξ = Ω(k).
4 Experiments
In this section, we design and conduct experiments to mea-
sure social inefficiency in equilibrium, and the effects of k
and ξ on the inefficiency. On a high level, our experiments
support our qualitative theoretical conclusions.
4.1 Algorithms
We use best-response dynamics [Matsui, 1992], described in
Algorithm 1, to find NEs. A strategy of node i is a best re-
sponse if it maximizes the utility of i given the others’ strate-
gies. In best-response dynamics, nodes iteratively deviate to
a best response, until an NE is reached. We run best-response
dynamics starting from a strategy profile where no node buys
a good. In both our games, best-response dynamics always
converges to an NE, as formalized in Theorem 5.
Theorem 5 (Convergence of Best-Response Dynamics). For
both SGGs and SGG-ACs, Algorithm 1 converges to an NE
after at most three while loops in lines 5–10.
Algorithm 1: Best-Response Dynamics
Input : G(V, E): network,
b: benefit, p: price, a: access cost
Output: a strategy profile s corresponding to an NE
1 for each node i ∈ V do
2 (in SGG) si ← 0
3 (in SGG-AC) si ← a random strategy inNi(k)\{i}
4 sort nodes in a random order
5 while strategy profile s is not an NE do
6 for each node i ∈ V in the sorted order do
7 umax ← maxx∈Si ui((x, s−i))
8 if ui((si, s−i)) < umax then
9 Bi ← {x ∈ Si : ui(x, s−i) = umax}
10 si ← a randomly chosen strategy in Bi
11 return s = (s1, ..., sn)
Proof. Assume first that the game is an SGG-AC. Given a
strategy profile s, call a node underprivileged if it is not ac-
cessing a good (it may have neighbors buying a good), and
call a node an owner if it buys a good. There are four types
of possible deviations a node can use to improve its utility.
Case 1. An underprivileged node buys a good since it has no
k-hop neighbor buying a good.
Case 2. An underprivileged node rents a good (free rides in
SGG) since it has a k-hop neighbor buying a good
but has at most ξ − 1 followers.
Case 3. A non-owner buys a good, even though it has a k-
hop neighbor buying a good, because it has at least ξ
followers (who were underprivileged).
Case 4. An owner changes its action to renting (free riding
in SGG) since it has a k-hop neighbor buying a good
but has at most ξ − 1 followers.
In SGGs, only Cases 1 and 4 are possible, ignoring the con-
ditions on the number of followers for Case 4. We now prove
that after at most 3 iterations of the while loop, s is an NE.
Claim 1. After the first iteration, Case 3 cannot happen.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that Case 3 happened for a
node i after the first iteration. Right before this, i did not own
a good, so either i never owned a good, or it owned a good
(via Case 1 or 3) and rented a good (free rode in SGG) later
(via Case 4). Note that a node cannot get any more followers
while it does not own a good. If i never owned a good, it
means all its followers followed it from the beginning, so i
should have bought a good in the first iteration, leading to
contradiction. If i once owned a good but decided to rent a
good (free ride in SGG) later via Case 4, the number of its
followers at the moment of the decision was at most ξ − 1,
and it could not have gained additional followers since then
— again leading to a contradiction.
Claim 2. After the second iteration, Case 4 cannot happen.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that Case 4 happened for a
node i after the second iteration, which means that i gave up
its good and decided to rent a good (free ride in SGG). Note
Case 1 does not apply to i’s k-hop neighbors when i owned
the item, and by Claim 1, even Case 3 does not apply after
the first iteration. This implies after the first iteration, no new
owner appeared among i’s k-hop neighbors, and the number
of i’s followers only increased. Thus, either Case 4 should
have applied to i earlier, or i should not have bought the good
(Case 3 did not apply), leading to a contradiction.
Claim 3. After the third iteration, Case 1 and Case 2 cannot
happen.
Proof. If a node is underprivileged after the third iteration,
Case 4 must have happened in the third iteration or later, con-
tradicting Claim 2.
Combining all the claims, s converges to an NE after at
most three while loops.
Calculating the optimal social cost is also required
to measure the efficiency of NEs. This problem is
NP-hard, since it is equivalent to the minimum k-
dominating set problem, which is known to be NP-hard
[Hedetniemi and Laskar, 1991]. Fortunately, we can easily
formulate the problem as an integer program, and solve it us-
ing intlinprog in MATLAB.
4.2 Datasets
We run simulations on the following networks:
• Synthetic:
– Star (100 nodes, 99 edges).
– Chain (100 nodes, 99 edges).
– Random (50 nodes, 127 edges): an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
random graph G(50, 0.1) (i.e., 50 nodes and each
edge exists i.i.d. with probability 0.1).
• Real:
– Karate club (34 nodes, 78 edges): a friendship net-
work between the members of a karate club at a
university [Zachary, 1977].
– Hamsterster (1,858 nodes, 12,534 edges): a
friendship network between the users of Hamster-
ster, an online community for hamster owners.
– Advogato (5,155 nodes, 51,127 edges): a trust net-
work between the users of Advogato, an online
community for programmers [Massa et al., 2009].
4.3 Simulation Results
In Table 4, social costs of social optima, NEs in SGGs, and
NEs in SGG-ACs are compared. For NEs, we report the av-
erage social cost of 1, 000 NEs returned by Algorithm 1. The
price p of a good, which is simply a scale factor, is set to 1.
Inefficiency of NEs in SGG.As seen in Table 4, the largest
inefficiency (i.e., social cost in NEs / the optimal cost) 97.6 is
obtained on the star graph. This is because the efficient NE,
where only the center node buys a good, is unlikely to be re-
alized, as the center node loses the incentive to buy a good
as soon as any of the others does. Thus, the inefficient NE,
where all nodes except the center node buy a good, is real-
ized with high probability. On the chain graph and the ran-
dom graph, however, the inefficiency is only 1.28 and 1.55,
respectively, since high-degree nodes, which are main source
of inefficiency, do not exist. On real networks, where high-
degree nodes exist (albeit not as extreme as the star graph),
the inefficiency is between 3.28 and 4.25.
Table 4: Social costs when k = 1. The numbers in the parentheses indicate the standard deviations.
Dataset
Social Cost
Optimum Cost NEs in SGGs
NEs in SGG-ACs
ξ = 1 ξ = 2 ξ = 5 ξ = 10 ξ = 20
Star 1 97.6 (9.50) 1.69 (10.9) 3.06 (12.6) 5.92 (21.4) 10.2 (28.6) 20.5 (39.1)
Chain 34 43.5 (1.37) 45.5 (1.65) 43.5 (1.36) 43.5 (1.38) 43.5 (1.35) 43.5 (1.38)
Random 11 17.0 (1.92) 18.9 (1.46) 15.9 (1.70) 17.1 (1.91) 17.1 (1.90) 17.1 (1.90)
Karate club 4 17.0 (3.31) 10.2 (1.73) 8.46 (3.14) 14.3 (4.80) 17.0 (3.36) 17.1 (3.26)
Hamsterster 241 970 (23.6) 526 (12.4) 426 (16.3) 581 (36.8) 827 (49.8) 956 (32.1)
Advogato 806 2643 (27.1) 1468 (22.5) 1196 (30.7) 1475 (56.2) 1887 (82.6) 2199 (101)
Table 5: Social costs when k > 1.
Dataset Outcomes
Social Cost
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4
Karate club
Optimum Cost 2 1 1
NEs in SGGs 3.23 1.76 1.28
NEs in SGG-ACs 3.23 1.75 1.26
Hamsterster
Optimum Cost 65 32 28
NEs in SGGs 188 90.7 46.3
NEs in SGG-ACs 128 65.0 41.7
Advogato
Optimum Cost 156 69 58
NEs in SGGs 670 283 102
NEs in SGG-ACs 377 129 86.5
Effects of access costs on reducing the social ineffi-
ciency. As seen in Table 4, the inefficiency significantly de-
creases in SGG-ACs with an appropriate access cost, com-
pared to SGGs. In particular, on the star graph, the inef-
ficiency decreases by 93%. This is because the inefficient
NE, where all nodes except the center node buy the good,
is unlikely to be realized, as the center node can still buy a
good even when it has neighbors buying goods. For similar
reasons, the inefficiency on real networks also decreases by
50%− 56%. Since the inefficiency on the chain and random
graphs is already low in SGGs, the improvement is smaller.
Access costs thatmaximize efficiency. As seen in Table 4,
inefficiency is lowest at ξ = 2 (p/3 < a < p/2), consistent
with our suggestion of ξ = max(2⌊k/2⌋+1, 2) in Section 3.
The inefficiency tends to increase as ξ increases.
Effects of k. Social costs on real networks when k > 1
are shown in Table 5, where we set ξ to 6 on Karate club and
4 on the others. In both SGGs and SGG-ACs, inefficiency in
NEs decreases as k increases, which is consistent with Theo-
rems 2, 3, and 4. Although the inefficiency is still smaller in
SGG-ACs than in SGGs, the gap decreases as k increases.
5 Related Work
We first review previous work directly related to net-
work games with shareable goods. See the work of
Galeotti et al. [2010], and the chapter by Jackson and
Zenou [2014], for an introduction to network games in gen-
eral.
Bramoulle´ and Kranton [2007] and
Bramoulle´ et al. [2014] study a network game where
the strategy of each node is its contribution to a public good,
and its utility is a function of its own contribution and that of
its direct neighbors.
Ballester et al. [2006] consider a similar gamewhere, how-
ever, the utility of each node is a concave function of its
effort and a linear function of its neighbors’. With these
conditions, the game has a unique NE where the effort of
each node is proportional to its Bonacich centrality score.
Elliott and Golub [2013] study an extended game in directed,
weighted graphs where an edge (i, j) indicates the marginal
benefit that node i can provide to node j. Allouch [2015]
develops a model where consumptions of both private goods
and public goods are taken into account.
In our models (of Section 2), each node simply decides
whether to buy a good or access its neighbors’, rather than the
amount of effort. Instead, we extend the previous models, es-
pecially the best-shot game [Hirshleifer, 1983], in that (a) ac-
cess costs can be imposed on free riders and (b) nodes can
benefit not only from direct neighbors but also k-hop neigh-
bors. In contrast to previous work, we analyze PoA and PoS,
and provide empirical results on real social networks.
Our work is also related to the huge body of lit-
erature on the price of anarchy. The concept it-
self is due to Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [1999], and
the price of stability was introduced a few years later
by Anshelevich et al. [2004]. These concepts underlie
much work at the intersection of game theory and AI,
e.g., in computational social choice [Braˆnzei et al., 2013],
security games [Lou and Vorobeychik, 2015], and rout-
ing [Vasserman et al., 2015].
To the best of our knowledge, the price-of-anarchy pa-
per that is most closely related to ours is the one by
Kun et al. [2013]. They give bounds on the price of anar-
chy of an anti-coordination game played on a graph, albeit a
fundamentally different one: each player chooses a color, and
the utility of a player is the number of neighbors with differ-
ent colors. In their work, k-hop neighbors are not considered,
and access costs are incompatible with the model. It is also
worth mentioning that our use of access costs to reduce the
inefficiency of equilibria is conceptually related to work on
taxation in congestion games [Caragiannis et al., 2010].
6 Final Words
In our view, the most actionable conclusion from our work
is that in the type of scenarios under consideration (shareable
goods on a network), access costs should be imposed when
possible. Despite the whimsical title of our paper, this would
be hard to do at a societal level for things like ski equipment
and portable cribs. However, it certainly seems feasible at
the level of an organization. For example, a university could
mandate access costs for expensive lab equipment bought by
individual researchers, as this would actually decrease the
amount of grant money that is invested in buying equipment.
For the designer of a multi-agent system, imposing access
costs is trivial, and, similarly, might lead (would lead, if one
trusts our analysis) to significant benefits.
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A Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. For the upper bound, fix an arbitrary NE s ∈ T . Let
O be the set of nodes who buy a good in s, and call them
owners. For each owner i ∈ O, we call i a rich owner if
|Fi| ≥ ξ, i.e., ui(s) is at least the utility of renting a good.
Otherwise, call i a poor owner. The number of rich owners is
at most n/(ξ + 1).
Note that any two poor owners are at distiance at least k +
1 from each other, since otherwise they prefer to access the
other’s good. Let k′ = ⌊k/2⌋, and for each poor owner i ∈ V ,
consider Ni(k′), the set of nodes within distance k′ from i
(called a ball around i). Since each pair of poor owners are at
distance at least k+1 from each other, these balls are pairwise
disjoint.
Call a ball Ni(k′) big if it has at least k′ nodes, and small
otherwise. If a ball Ni(k′) is small, i is in a connected com-
ponent with less than k′ nodes, and there is no other owner
in that component. Let c be the number of connected compo-
nents in G. Since there are at most n/k′ big balls and c small
balls, the number of poor owners is equal to the number of
balls, which is at most n/k′ + c. The total number of owners
is at most n/k′ + n/(ξ + 1) + c.
Since the optimal social cost is at least cp, the gap be-
tween the optimal social cost and the social cost of s is
(n/k′+n/(ξ+1)+c)p
cp = O(n/k + n/ξ) = O(max(n/k, n/ξ)).
For the lower bound of Ω(n/k), for any integers k,m, ξ ≥
1, consider a tree G = (V , E) where there is a center node
1, and m simple paths with k nodes. For m of them (called
arms), one of two endpoints is connected to 1. It is easy to
see that the optimal social cost is at most p, since if 1 buys
a good, all nodes can access it. But if we consider a strategy
profie where the endpoint not connected to 1 buys a good for
each arm and each node follows the endpoint of its own arm
(1 follows an arbitrary one), it is an NE of social cost m.
Therefore, the gap ism = Ω(n/k).
For the lower bound of Ω(n/ξ), for any integers k,m, ξ ≥
1, let G = (V , E) be the complete graph onm(ξ+1) vertices.
Obviously the optimal social cost is p, but if m nodes buy
a good and have ξ followers each, it becomes an NE with
social costmp. The gap is Ω(n/ξ). Combining the two lower
bounds, the theorem is proved.
